The United States launched fresh military strikes against Iran on Monday — targeting missile sites and boats attempting to lay mines in southern Iranian waters — even as diplomatic talks to end the war continued in parallel through Qatari intermediaries.
The contradiction at the centre of this conflict has never been more visible: Washington is simultaneously bombing Iran and trying to cut a deal with it.
US Central Command confirmed the strikes in a statement, describing them as acts of “self-defence” designed to “protect our troops from threats posed by Iranian forces.” The targeted area sits near Bandar Abbas — Iran’s major southern port city and home to a critical naval base positioned directly on the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian authorities in Bandar Abbas confirmed explosions had been heard in the area before the official US announcement.
Iran Shoots Back — and Claims the Right to Retaliate
Tehran did not stay quiet.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced on Tuesday that it had shot down a US drone and fired on a fighter jet and a second drone that entered Iranian airspace. The IRGC did not specify the exact timing of these incidents.
More significantly, Iran declared it held a “legitimate and definite” right to retaliate against what it described as US ceasefire violations. That language — deliberate, formal, and legally framed — signals that Tehran is keeping its military options explicitly open even while its diplomats remain at the negotiating table.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, addressing the annual Hajj pilgrimage in a rare public message, escalated the rhetoric further. “The Middle East will no longer serve as shields for US bases,” he said, adding that America was “moving away from its previous status day by day.”
Khamenei has not been seen publicly since taking over from his late father. US intelligence, according to CBS News, believes he is sheltering in an undisclosed location after being injured in the Israeli strike that killed his predecessor on the war’s first day. That physical isolation is reportedly slowing the pace of negotiations, as communication between the supreme leader and his envoys remains difficult and indirect.
A Deal Is Still Possible — But the Strait Must Open
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking to reporters during an official visit to India, refused to let the latest strikes derail the diplomatic narrative entirely.
“We’ll see if we can make progress,” he said. “There’s a lot of talking back and forth going on about specific language in the initial document — it’ll take a few days.”
He confirmed that President Trump had expressed his desire to reach an agreement but added the characteristically blunt framing that has defined Washington’s negotiating posture: “He’s either going to make a good deal or no deal.”
On the Strait of Hormuz — the waterway Iran has kept largely closed since the war began in February — Rubio was unambiguous. “The straits have to be open. They’re going to be open one way or the other. What’s happening there is unlawful, it’s illegal, it’s unsustainable for the world, it’s unacceptable.”
That final phrase is worth underlining. “One way or the other” is not diplomatic language. It is a military threat dressed in negotiating clothes — and it reflects the core of Washington’s position: Iran can either open the strait through an agreement or the US will open it by force.
What the Proposed Deal Actually Contains
According to multiple US and international media reports, the memorandum of understanding currently under discussion covers three main elements.
First, a 60-day ceasefire extension to stabilise the current fragile pause in fighting. Second, the formal reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. Third, a framework for further negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme — the most contentious issue of the entire conflict.
The harder questions — sanctions relief, the release of Iranian frozen assets, and specific demands over nuclear enrichment — are expected to be deferred to later rounds of negotiation rather than resolved in the initial agreement.
Trump added a new and explosive dimension to the nuclear question on Monday night. He stated that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium — estimated by the International Atomic Energy Agency at around 440 kilograms enriched to 60 per cent purity, a short technical step from weapons-grade material — must either be “immediately” transferred to the United States or “destroyed in place.”
That demand, if maintained as a non-negotiable condition, dramatically complicates any near-term agreement. Iran has consistently rejected external control over its nuclear programme. Demanding the physical transfer of its enriched uranium to American custody is not a minor concession — it is a strategic surrender of Iran’s most significant deterrent.
Iranian Negotiators: No Imminent Signing
Despite weekend reporting that the two sides were close to a deal, Iran’s foreign ministry moved quickly to manage expectations.
Spokesman Esmail Baqai confirmed that “a large portion of the issues under discussion” had been resolved but was categorical that this did not mean a signing was imminent.
“No-one can make such a claim,” he said.
The gap between Washington’s characterisation of the talks as nearly concluded and Tehran’s more cautious framing reflects the fundamental asymmetry of the negotiating dynamic. The US is operating with domestic political pressure — Trump’s approval ratings have declined sharply since the Iran war began, and a deal would represent a significant political win. Iran is negotiating from a position of strategic endurance, willing to absorb pressure as long as it retains its core red lines.
Earlier in May, a clash in the Strait of Hormuz — each side blaming the other — threatened to collapse the ceasefire entirely. Trump insisted the ceasefire remained in place. The strikes on Monday suggest that the ceasefire, in practice, is a contested and unstable framework rather than a genuine pause in hostilities.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Global Economy
The economic stakes of this conflict extend far beyond the Middle East.
Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz when the war began on 28 February, following US and Israeli strikes on the country. The strait carries approximately one fifth of the world’s oil and gas shipments. Its closure sent global energy prices soaring and triggered significant supply chain disruption across Asia, Europe, and Africa.
For Nigeria — Africa’s largest oil producer and a country whose own petroleum revenues depend heavily on global crude pricing — the trajectory of the Hormuz crisis has direct economic consequences. A prolonged closure supports higher global oil prices, which benefits Nigeria’s export revenues. A deal that reopens the strait would likely ease price pressure but potentially reduce the windfall that current disruption has created.
Nigerian policymakers, energy analysts, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Company are watching developments in the Gulf with the close attention they deserve. The Strait of Hormuz is not a regional problem. It is a global one.
A Ceasefire in Name Only
The ceasefire between US and Iranian forces has nominally been in place since April 8. In that time, there has been a clash in the Strait, a fresh round of US strikes on Iranian territory, Iranian forces shooting down an American drone, and both sides publicly accusing the other of violations.
This is not a ceasefire in any meaningful operational sense. It is a pause — fragile, contested, and maintained not by genuine agreement but by the mutual recognition that full-scale resumption of hostilities carries costs neither side is yet ready to absorb.
Whether the talks in Qatar produce anything durable in the coming days will determine whether this pause holds or shatters. The world’s energy markets, the stability of the Middle East, and the political futures of leaders in Washington and Tehran are all riding on the answer.
